ISSUE30/31 Vol.3 - March 31,1996.
ISSUE30/31 Vol.3 - March 31,1996.
"Arkzin", "Nezavisni", "Republika", "Svijet", "Vreme"and "Novi Prelom" discuss the events and prospects in the post -Deyton Bosnia
"Feral Tribune" examines the developments in two ongoing political court cases in Croatia
"Monitor" looks behind the closed session of the Christian churches in Belgrade
"Feral Tribune" analyzes the decision of the Council of Europe to admit Croatia, and "Globus" the cropping up of new authoritarian elements in that country
"Nezavisni" writes about the Congress of the ruling SPS party in Serbia
"Koha" brings the results of a survey in Kosovo on the possible solutionfor that province and "Nezavisni" on the Vojvodina regional plan
"Vreme" discusses the overtaking of a radio station by Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, and the closure of the "Soros Foundation in FRY, "Feral Tribune" the changes in the Criminal law of Croatia concerning media
"Monitor", analyzes the recent military agreement between FRY and Russia
"Vreme" brings a special article on war profiteering and a political opinion
Many analysts foresee the renewal of military conflicts after the departure of NATO troops and they are probably right. No matter how convincing the politicians are that bosnia is not divided, it clearly is. This is seen by people in Bosnia, but this did not prevent them to express joy, when Clinton, after few years of observation, finally stopped the slaughter.
Except for the state and political bodies defined by the Constitution, Dayton agreement lists a very small number of instruments of civil government. The month of March should have seen the nomination of a Human rights ombudsman and Council for Human rights, Committee for the refugee and expelled. A High civil commissioner is guiding civil operations in the meantime.
Among the most important duties of civil authorities is, of course, the return of refugees. If the goal of returning at least half of 1,3 million refugees to their homes, before the elections, envisioned for the end of september, at least 2,100 of them would have to return daily, starting with the beginning of March. Some are returning, but the larger number of them will do so, only when IFOR guarantees their safety.
So the question arises, - can the institutions formed by the Agreement secure peace and normal life and co- existence ? Many commentators have already concluded that the realization of the civil part of the operation is not adequately elaborated. Important decisions and operations are left to improvisation. While the military aspect of the operation has a chance to fulfill its mandate - the end of the conflict - the civil hardly has a chance to establish permanent peace. The example of Mostar shows the best how complicated the civil part is.
Two years of intensive work and 20 million dollars invested by the EU were not enough the renew the city and ties between the communities. Only the politicians most responsible for the war got the chance to pass trough the process of the transformation of the conflict. More than twenty million people in post-Yugoslav states still lives the conflict, since none of us were invited to Dayton. The people live in hardship conditions, on the basic level of existence and are attempting to understand the situation. The controlled media feed them with hatred, since they do not present the people of other nations as equally worth. Will the people have the chance to express their opinion in the country from which a larger part of the intellectuals and young experts have left ?
The author thinks that the lesson of de-nazification of Germany could be educational, since a large amount of energy, creativity and financial help was invested there, so that lesson from democracy could be learned in a place where they have so much supporters "one party, one leader, one nation". Haven't the people in post-Yugoslav states shown too much enthusiasm for similar ideas ? The spirit of pressure and lack of freedom is felt in Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia.
It would be natural that the support programmes find solutions to important questions like: how could people participate is the process of decision making? How could people, with the lives destroyed by war, in demolished houses, learn overnight what is the participation of the public? Will the children in elementary schools learn something about human rights , or will they be left to repeat the mistakes of their parents? Will they speak in their name, or will they continue the silence?
The victors of the Second world war have supported the process of the democratization of Germany from many reasons. The motivation was stronger than in Bosnia. Germany was richer and more important in the eyes of the world leaders. Now is the moment for Europe to decide whether it can allow itself a renewed military conflict, or will it rather invest in a solid peace process. The crucial question is whether the money will be streamlined only in the military apparatus, or the democratization programmes? The return of refugees is a complicated process in which the reparation of property is only the smaller part. The people that are returning, as well as the ones receiving them, have to be prepared for strong tensions, and inevitable conflicts. Do the international institutions want to extend support to civil initiatives which deal with non - violent resolution of conflicts and human rights? Will they understand how important it is to encourage the local peace, women and other groups?
In the last few months many have stated that now is the time to start the reconstruction and that the war crimes should be put aside, which is very shortsighted. The experience of the last world war, when many wounds were left unhealed, and many crimes pushed aside, show this not to be a good idea. The processes against those responsible for the deaths of hundreds, could regain confidence in international community. Still, the Hague tribunal can only carry out a part of the job. It is crucially important that a process of trials of the perpetrators from own ranks is begun in all countries.
Source: Zagreb weekly "Arkzin", March 1, 1996
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Mihal Ramac of the Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni" attempts in the February 3, 1996, issue to answer the question whether the resignation of Hans Koschnick means the end of the attempts to restore unified Bosnia and Herzegovina by the international community.
The war was worse. Still, the more peace lasts, it seems more that the Bosnian knot is impossible to untangle. The warring parties are separated, here and there some order is being established, but all is far away from that peace from the textbooks. There is no remorse for the deeds done. All think that they were or are right, meaning that nothing is solved.
While in Sarajevo, Belgrade and Zagreb, but also in Mostar, Brcko, Maglaj, Tesanj, Srebrenica and Travnik and every other village, are in power those that started the war - there is no sight of peaceful Bosnia. Those who do not believe this should only take a listen to any news programme of Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb radio. Everything is exactly the same as in the beginning of 1992, all is full of poison and happiness for the problems happening to others.
Belgrade is more than happy for the disintegration of Koschnick's attempts to unify Mostar. If Muslims and Croats cannot make it together, even less could Serbs do it with them, the message goes. Zagreb is also ectatic: according to it, unified Bosnia nad Herzegovina is only possible under the condition that the central authority does not meddle in the internal matters of the regions under Croatian control. The official Sarajevo is delighted with the exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo suburbs. Well, they say, we are pleading them to stay, and they do not want to.
It seems that all three sides are satisfied by the turn of events and current outcome - the victory of ethnic cleansing. The winners are all those which have survived and who have won the right to be skinned and mistreated by their own co-nationals. If Karadzic, Krajisnik and Koljevic are still good for the Serbs from Grbavica, for the Muslims and Croats they are even better.
To clear its conscience, the world will send money, cans and clothing. Mostly to those oases in which the life will continue according to its rules. If those oases become enticing for those from the ethnically cleansed hills, maybe that will bring in the beginning of some new, better Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, ethnic cleansing will continue.
Source: Novi Sad weekly "Nezavisni, February 23, 1996
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President of the European movement in Serbia (and former minister of foreign affairs in the early Seventies) Mirko Tepavac, discusses in the March 1-31, 1996, issue of the Belgrade by-weekly "Republika" about the political tendencies for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Since the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, as the deeper background of the division of power and interests, an old plan, that of division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia has remained and outlived all others. His longevity and resistance to numerous changes in the balance of power and war luck, could serve as a proof in itself that the annexation of Bosnia nad Herzegovina, and its division, is actually that deeper motive of the unbroken political and operative meddling of the both interested sides.
The greater nationalistic plans of Serbia and Croatia, have always understood the disappearance of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a tri-ethnic state union. To all "Greater Croatia'"and "Greater Serbia's" independent, multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina always stood in the way, What was not publicly said by Milosevic and Tudjman, was shouted by Seselj and Seks, and wished by the Churches and academies of Science, and, unfortunately, even some more moderate people than them.
Have these project finally been abandoned? Is the Dayton Agreement the end of the story, if it is the end of the war ?
The Dayton agreement explicitly affirms the territorial integrity of the internationally recognized BiH. But, that agreement, in its intention to achieve "peace now", recognized the existence of two separate entities and three mono ethnic units, of which the Serbian and Croatian ones have thoroughly cleansed the Muslims. The insistence on the ethnic division of Mostar, on the retaining of "Serbian Sarajevo", then insufficient and possibly not the final cancellation of the Croatian Herzeg-Bosnia and the weakness of the Bosnian-Croat federation; the wrangling around the Posavina corridor and similar, show that the tendency to guard the divisions is much more vital than the tendency to integrate BiH as a multiethnic, multi-confessional and multicultural state unit, which both Serbia and Croatia, grudgingly accepted in Dayton.
If it is shown that these divisions can hold and strengthen, and the principle of unity compromise itself, Bosnia of two or three parts could again be in the process of division between Serbia and Croatia with completely unknown chances of the survival of the Muslim entity. All could start as the already legalized "strengthening of special ties", the care and worry for the protection of the diasporas, and end in annexation and always possible Serb - Croat conflict, even war. The world, Europe and the Balkans would then find themselves with a larger problem than the one they are solving now, and the encouraged ethnocentrism could open many new warfronts.
The Dayton agreement - even with all its preciseness - still does not close all the doors for the tri- state separatism, which as such does not exclude all the perspectives to the imaginative manipulators of the enlargement of Serbia and Croatia at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is why it could be decidedly said: If the ethnic monolithic entitities remain for long as they are now, the division of BiH between Serbia and Croatia will only be the matter of time and favorable moment - depending on wider framework - it could patiently wait or impatiently hurry.
From that aspect one should estimate the uninterrupted and already completely legalized leading of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Belgrade and Zagreb and strengthening of political, personal and party strongholds of both sides in it. Neither Serbia nor Croatia have not so far - unless they were forced - done anything which would lessen such a presence. Favoring this development is the leaning - doubtfully inevitable - of the Contact Group and NATO on the "key role" of Milosevic and Tudjman in guiding the plans and deeds of the Bosnian national leaders, whom they have order until yesterday how to lead the war.
Mononational units in current Bosnia and Herzegovina are not created by the urgencies of life, but war violence and national - chauvinistic theory about the impossibility of joint life as its ideological background. If Bosnia was ethnically divisible, it would already be non existent for a long time. When at least a part of the refugees return to their homes, then again it will not be possible to have single national rule in any of its parts.
The trial of the war criminals will not only be the satisfying of justice, but essential enlightenment of the motives, causes and those that caused the great tragedy which has so incorrigibly and deeply degraded people and nations. In the war in which the violent conflict itself was by itself a great crime, trial of the criminals is indispensable precondition of purification and return to senses.
Source: Belgrade by-weekly "Republika", March 1-31, 1996
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Analyst of the Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", Gojko Beric, takes a look at the state of the Muslim-Croat federation in the March14, 1996, issue of the magazine.
If all the relevant statements about the Muslim-Croat federation given in the last few weeks were analyzed, it could be concluded that it fell apart even before it started. The federal reality is far away from the political phrase according to which this formation has no alternative. As if there is a silent agreement about its euthanasia and transformation into a political mummy.
Today, the Croats which follow the policies of the HDZ party would be happy if the Bosniaks would be first to give up on the alliance, but also the Bosniaks grouped around SDA would not be too sad if the Croats would be the first to do that. Within their relations, the Federation was never in the primary realm, except as a cause for accusations which HDZ and SDA send each other. Their state-forming programmes are quite different. The national one not so much, since they are based on the ethnic religious and political homogenization, at which the question of living space is placed as primary. That is why the federal state has the appearance as pure fiction. If there was no fear from the American reaction, this agreement would, by all means, already represent a completely unbinding formality. This fear has also produced a synthagm about the "breakers of the Federation". Sometimes it serves a local purpose, but more often as a means by which Washington would step on the other side's toes.
The official Croatian media have taken a grudge with Ejup Ganic that during his speech on the Statehood Day in Sarajevo "he did not say one word about the Federation". This and similar accusations count on certain political usability. This is happening because the US has created a semblance that with the installment of the Federation it is solving the Bosnian question But, already the first analyses of the Washington agreement have said that it actually puts forward ethnic, spiritual and political separation of Bosniaks and Croats. By this, ethic division of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the Serbs concluded their part of the job, taking over Srebrenica and Zepa, the making of the Dayton agreement started. With it, the territorial conquest and ethnic cleansing were certified, crowned with the recognition of Republika Srpska.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", March 14, 1996
Slavko Santic of the Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", examines in the March 28, 1996 issue of that magazine whether Sarajevo will only be the capital of one of the cantons, or will it remain the main city of the Sate and the Federation, and in that respect acquire the status of a district.
After March 19 and the entrance of Government troops into Grbavica, it was shown that Sarajevo, even though it was heavily wounded, is still alive. How long will the healing period last and whether it will be successful - remains to be seen.
But, in the midst of this painful process of reintegration, when it seemed that for the legal city authorities there is nothing more important, Sarajevo went (and is still) going through a very dramatic inter-city crisis. A great storm arose around the formation of a Sarajevo canton, on which the most powerful (all) ruling SDA party insisted, but which was energetically resisted by (less) ruling national party - HDZ. The first called upon the Dayton agreement, so they, in a strange coalition with the oppositionary SDP and UBSD, without the participation of the Croatian representatives at the constitutive session, passed through the formation of Sarajevo, meaning that they gained majority rule in the city and its re-integrated parts. For others, the "cantonization" of Sarajevo puts the Croats, as federal partners, in a lesser position, makes them a national minority, and in that sense threatens their nationals interests in a multiple manner.
Actually, both sides ignore not only those from "their" nation which are not the members of their parties, but members of all other, which are members of other parties, or, simply, do not belong to anybody. But, it is particularly important that the Serbs who have spent the whole war in the free part of Sarajevo, according to the constitution of the Federation and by the Dayton agreement, are not considered as a constitutive nation, so they cannot even participate in this inter-national quarrel about the rule in Sarajevo. In that sense, the two conflicting partners fully agree - they do not even think about them.
So far, the Sarajevo canton gained in territory, and the SDA party in its power. In the case that Sarajevo would become a district, it would be reduced territorially to the strict city center, but all nations would equally share power. But, then this would really be a capital with all that entails. For SDA it is obvious that it is more important to have all the power, than what will happen with Sarajevo.
Source: Sarajevo weekly "Svijet", March 28, 1996
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Sarajevo correspondent of the Belgrade weekly "Vreme", Radenko Udovicic, discusses the preparations of the opposition parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) for the upcoming elections.
Like Salih Foco of the Liberal Bosnian Organization (LBO), many opposition politicians in Bosnia are complaining about the rule which provides that the political parties have to provide 10 thousand signatures to be eligible to present candidates in these elections: he thinks this fully suits the ruling SDa party. But, the journalists circles, says Udovicic say that the OESCE put such a high census for the participation, it seems, because, it will, along with some other organizations, finance the election campaign of the parties, so that it wants that number to be as small as possible. The OESCE circles themselves deny such financing, but also do not want to divulge any detailed information.
The Higher court in Sarajevo has registered 31 parties. The register still contains a large number of parties that have disappeared from the political scene at the beginning of the war. The only party stricken from the register is the "Serbian Democratic Party (of Radovan Karadzic), which was proclaimed as terrorist organization by Bosnian authorities. In the current period, not one political party was further registered in Sarajevo.
One of the key themes discussed in Sarajevo has been for a while a possibility of the formation of the party of former prime minister Haris Silajdzic. There are various rumours about the leadership of such a party, added to by former prime minister himself, who keeps the tension with frequent media appearances. It is speculated that his personal friends, former ministers Muharem Cero and Enes Karic will be within it, as well as members of the Bosnian Presidency, Ivo Komsic and Mirko Pejanovic. These conclusions are derived from the fact that Komsic announced his resignation to the Presidency post, and that he has left his former - Croatian Peasant Party. On the other hand, Pejanovic is known to be of very pro-Bosnian and civic orientation, along with the fact that he is the president of the Serbian civic Council. "Evil tongues" say though, that Silajdzic requires "a token Serb".
It is said that Silajdic's party will follow "the middle way", of all those who want to see a re-integrated Bosnia. This also means that it is also definite now that Silajdzic opted for the formation of a party, and not of a civil democratic movement consisting of existing parties, where he would play a leading role. The largest speculations concerned the ties with the Liberal party and its leader Rasim Kadic, former president of the Youth organization of Bosnia (within former Yugoslavia). He is considered to be a cunning and promising politician of left of center orientation, with pronounced Bosniak characteristics, and many see him as the Bosnian president in ten years. But a month ago, he announced a coalition with Silajdizic's party, who is still not saying anything.
It is obvious that Silajdzic's intention is to draw out as many people as possible out of the national parties and draw them towards him. It is quite possible that large part of the membership will consist of the so called "soft wing" of the SDA. But, there are doubts within the opposition concerning the formation of this new party. Due to its position - political center - there is a realistic fear that quite a number of voters, which supported civic parties, even some leftist ones (Social democrats, and Bosnia - Herzegovina Social democrats of Selim Beslagic) could follow the party of the former Prime minister - he is popular with city folk unburdened with national feelings and with women. His programme - "all Bosnians for a unified Bosnia", is obviously seen favorably by people of clear minds, unfrustrated and not made vengeful by the war. But, there is also quite a number of those in Sarajevo who think that Haris Silajdzic will have the same fate s Ante Markovic (former Yugoslav prime minister), who has formed his own party with a lot of pomp, or like Stipe Mesic in Croatia, who has split with the ruling HDZ with a lot of pretensions, both suffering electoral debacle.
An important electoral result is also expected by the left. It consists of the Socialdemocratic party, which came in first behind the three national parties at previous elections and the Union of Bosnia - Herzegovina Social-democrats (former Reformists of Ante Markovic), which have won at the elections in Tuzla. There is a discussion f coalition between these two parties, even unification into one. Speculations are on who would be the party president : Selim Beslagic, mayor of Tuzla and leader of the UBSD, or former Bosnian prime minister Zlatko Lagumdzija, vice-president of the SDP.
A lot of pomp was created in Bosnia and Herzegovina surrounding the formation of "Democratic National Union" of Fikret Abdic, who was declared a war criminal by Bosnian authorities. The party was registered at the Higher court in Mostar - located in the Croatian part.This created furious reaction by the Bosniak side. Federation's president Kresimir Zubak reacted by saying that Abdic has not been indicted by the Hague tribunal, and in that sense there are no obstacles for his political activity.
Many are of the opinion though, that this party, besides its political clout, has almost no chance for success, even though it was published in the Zagreb press that Abdic has seemingly collected 20 thousand signatures necessary to enter the elections.
It is symptomatic that the state Radio and TV has decided a month Ago not to follow the activities of the parties, allocating five minutes per week to each party to present its views. The opposition is boycotting this decision, as that it is not practically seen in any stronger media. All its party activities are geared towards the promotion in the press and private stations. Such a decision by the state media, could provoke, say in the opposition, a collective boycott of the election.
Source: Belgrade weekly "Vreme", March 9, 1996
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The Banja Luka by-weekly "Novi Prelom" (paper of the civic oriented Liberal Party) takes a look in its February 15, 1996 issue (author Slobodan Nagradic), at the party picture in "Republika Srpska" part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
What awaits Republika Srpska in the Bosnian elections? What awaits potential voters, who will they be able to vote for? Pluralism is in its beginnings - it is more declarative than it is realistically politically articulated. Currently, on the territory of REpublika Srpska there are more than 20 registered political parties.
First of all, of course, is the SDS- Serbian Democratic Party, which rules in the territory. Besides the fact that the membership of the SDS is leaving the party, it is still the strongest one in the area. Not only because it is in power, but because it is most numerous, and by its international organization best organized and most functional. SDS has its branches in all the counties of RS, functionaries, power, media, particularly the state TV and radio. In the programme sense, it is hard to define what this party stands for and what will be its election motto. So far, SDS was able to overcome all internal frictions mainly due to personal charisma of RadovanKaradzic, and it is questionable whether he will be participating in the elections at all. The members and sympathizers of this party think that their main election trump card will be - the statehood of Republika Srpska - which could turn into its main handicap: the price this was achieved with.Also, all the shortcomings and sins of the authorities, personal scandals and other will fall on the back of the SDS party.
The Serbian Radical Party (branch of the Vojislav Seselj party of Serbia) started with great euphoria at the local political scene during 1992. and 993. But it soon became apparent that SRS cannot carry the "glory", but also the responsibility, particularly since the Radicals showed themselves to be incoherent and internally conflictuaous. The first serious inter-party "discussion" ended in a split and formation of a new party - National Radical Party, which added a security sign to its name - Nikola Pasic (name of the most known Serbian politician of pre WW II era).
Along with these mentioned, the chance to enter the parliament have: Communist Union- Movement for Yugoslavia, partly because of the nostalgia of the electoral body, partly due to the financial help of the mother organization from Serbia - JUL.
The Liberal Party also has a chance to place its members in the parliament, its main advantage being the existence of an already established paper, as well as its ongoing activity within the Banja Luka parliament, where it has eight members.
Source: Banja Luka by-weekly "Novi Prelom", February 15, 1996
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After "minute and professional investigation case", as was described by the Croatian minister of interior Jarnjak, a court case was brought up in 1994 against nine citizens of Split (six were member of the regional party DA, while the ninth accused is Srecko Lorger, husband of the party president and member of the Croatian parliament Mira Ljubic-Lorger) who are accused of terrorism(involving an attack on the offices of the DA party!). The first and second accused, Jurica Gilic and Ben Dzarak, are also named as the main witnesses, on whose statements the whole case is based. Both have confessed to the act of terrorism, and both have named the other seven accused as the inspirers of the act: simply said, Gilic and Dzarak have placed and activated the explosives, inspired to this act by other seven.
But before the presentation of the case in the Military court in Split could begin, the process acquired a political epithet, since "Dalmatian Action" did all to present it as the attempt to stifle Dalmatian regionalism and criminalization of a political idea and a party, and the announcement of the case itself mobilized a wide number of organizations for the protection of Human rights from Croatia and abroad, many of which have announced their arrival in Split.
Kaic says that the Croatian state, through its Military prosecutor's office placed the supposed terrorists, but actually sat on it itself, mainly due to the fact that before it it had only in Split more than hundred terrorist attacks. It brought to court only the"Dalmatian action". It was logical to expect that well worked and expeditive court case before the Military court will serve to dispel any doubts. But since its inception almost two years ago (in March 1994), the arguments for further doubts only grew. After seven months of its duration, in October 1994, the court established that the third accused Duje Ancic simply disappeared, which became the reason for a 16 month postponement of the case.
In the meantime, Ancic lived freely in Zagreb, and was available to everybody, except the police, although a number of warrants were issued in his name. The change occurred by the end of last year, when Ancic, who got bored of the game, simply gave up. The case against DA could be continued. Everything remained the same: the inditement, the witnesses, the court, even the court hall where the trial is held. The only change is among the judges an part of the legal team.
The whole case is based on the statements of Gilic and Dzarak, both members of the Split |"low life", of which Gilic is obviously psychically weak person, who at the same time suffers from claustrophobia, while Dzarak is a frequent guest of police and court archives, with a well set jail experience. At the same time, he is a man with no citizenship, even though he is born in Split.
The developments in the case in 1994, as well as in its current continuation amply show that the statements of these two are result of police duress. While Dzarak has openly state that in court, Gilic changed his statement four times; twice he accused himself and others, twice he denied everything. In court, during his first appearance, he denied his participation in the bombing attack, this time changing it to the inditement version.
Attempting to free themselves of a two and a half year long nightmare, the nine accused and a whole political party, which up until recently held parliament seats, has brought the Croatian state, incarnated in the Military prosecutor, in front of an insolvable problem: it could either continue to criminalize regionalism as a movement or to admit all its evil intentions, and leave "the terrorists" at peace. The insistence with which the military prosecutor is presenting his theses, even though the witness statements have ruined his case, leads to the conclusion that the state will not give up until the last "enemy" is walking its ground.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", March 1, 1996
In his text, Daskalovic says that initial comments of the commencement of the court case against a group of Croatian Serbs accused of spying for the former "Krajina" and Yugoslav armies, could be put into following: Balkan spies who, drinking brandy in remote cafes, exchange intelligence and "intelligence" information and receive for that a few hundred DEM, organized and lead by the officers of the former JNA, which, running away in front of the Croatian army last August leave behind them a complete documentation about their network and its activities - cannot end differently than in a Balkan manner: used in the election campaign in a court case which is to be used as proof of the public about a grand conspiracy against the Croatian state and the effectiveness and unchangeability of the current regime in its defense.
On the other hand, the same legal circles that gave the above comment, also express the opinion that this case in front of the Military court in Zagreb, having in mind that the inditement is based mainly on the documents found in the intelligence center in Knin, which could be authentic, but also fabricated, could inaugurate a practice of court cases against people,based on the fact that somebody in the intelligence, as well as secret police services, wrote documents on the basis of real or fabricated conversations and facts, making them a basis for a criminal prosecution of people.
The news on the capture of eighteen spies overflowed the media at the high point of the parliamentary pre-election campaign last year. The places in which they live, the professions and jobs they had, created an impression that "spies are all around us", that they have networked Croatia, and that they are present in the police, army, Parliament, courts, schools, factories and pensioners homes.
The first three accused, Mihajlo Knezevic, former colonel in the JNA, Mirko Vuletic, retired policeman from Zagreb, and citizen of Plasko Mile Kosanovic, which are claimed to be the organizers and leaders of this spy network,remain at large.
That it is a case of Balkan spying and Balkan spy games, as Daskalovic says, is seen in the presentation of the case against three persons heard so far - Nikola Ivancevic, Mile Cika and Dusan Tarabuk. Ivancevic,, who denied his guilt, said he is going to continue to defend himself with silence, since he was not given the possibility to read 1,400 page inditement, since "it was not his turn yet to do so". Cika, the policemen of the special police unit in Zagreb, also clams his innocence. His lawyer Ranko Radovic, presented arguments in the court that the information that Cika supposedly transferred as intelligence to Knin, was actually published in Croatian dailys, since the wording of the articles fully coincides with that of the inditement.
That documents found in Knin are full of incorrect facts is indicated by the case against Tarabuk. For example, for a date which is cited as the one on which he had a meeting with his connection in Subotica (FRY), Tarabuk claims to have been at his workplace in the Zagreb prison hospital, which could be easily checked through work evidence.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune", March 18, 1996
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Judging by a joint statement issued after the theological meeting in Belgrade, the will and hope that something could be done towards the reconciliation of the South Slav peoples exist, but the theologians themselves are conscious that the achievement of that goal needs to overcome too many earthly obstacles, so that the spiritual sphere of life could be reached. Exactly at the moment when this document was published, which first of all insists on the return of all refugees to their destroyed or intact homes, the Serbian leadership in Pale has by all means stimulated the exodus of its own nation from Sarajevo suburbs.
During the holding of the this meeting, another appeal of the Bihac-Petrovac bishop Hrizostom came out, calling all believers from his eparchy to return to their birthplaces. The proclamation also says: "Only our politicians deceive their people and are preparing for it bigger and worse challenges than the one we are brought to. They are preparing the following: that we give up our houses, villages and cities, our possessions, and that in a few months foreigners throw us out of the houses of those returning - Muslims and Croats". It says that this is "the moment when we are deciding whether we will be world's beggars, or return to our birthplaces, as we are allowed by international agreements and conventions". Bishop Hrizostom tells his compatriots that they should not be afraid of joint life "with people we lived with for centuries".
This proclamation, it seems, has a greater weight, and as could be found out, also a greater effect that the joint statement of some forty theologians from different parts of the world. First of all because it was put together by a religious dignitary from the region where he is a refugee himself, and certainly feels better the bitterness of a refugee, than all European analysts and official peacemakers.
Theologians, by the way, discussed the question of reconciliation from the theological, pastoral, and socio-political aspects. This gathering, as well as many others, has been stimulated from the outside. In the concrete case, the organizer is the Conference of European churches, and the Theological college of the Serbian Orthodox Church was only the host. The key question is when there will be initiatives coming from the churches located in the South slavic regions, so that they can sit down and discuss even the most unpleasant questions.
In any case, why wouldn't the church dignitaries clear out the basic question: how much did some churches and religious groups with their activities stimulate the tragedy to happen. Constant shifting of the responsibility on the other side and naming of Vatican and "foreign conspirators", is throwing of dust into the eyes. Even if the theories about the conspiracy were correct, the gravity of the question is not lessened: how could chauvinism, even fascism, become the leading thought of such a large number of people in the South Slavic regions.
Source: Podgorica weekly "Monitor", March 1, 1996
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Marinko Culic of the Split weekly "Feral Tribune", writes in the March 25, 1996 issue of that magazine about the background of the decision to admit Croatia in the European Council.
By the turn of events, it seems Croatia will be accepted in the Council of Europe, and the price that the president had to pay for that is actually much lower than expected.
In three years and seven months since it first knocked on the doors of the Council in Strasburg, Croatia is in no way a better state then it was, actuAlly, it is probable worse than before. In the meantime, there was a precise execution of the diabolic vision of the solution of the Serbian question as seen by a high official of the HDZ - out of the country, or under the earth - also, the relations between the croats in power and the co - nationals that are not are even further away from civil coexistence, and closer to the ideological and pseudoidelogical finger pointing and exclusion (satanization of the legal opponent parties as state enemies, destruction of the independent judiciary, reincarnation of the verbal delict).
What is worse, that depressive curve is now leaning further down towards worse. Right after the positive opinion of the Political committee of the Council of Europe, as if somebody was in a hurry to push as much waste and dirt under the Croatian banner, there came a row of condensed bursts of the well known bullying and self-containment from the Croatian state pantheon.
Actually, it is said, even by some participants, that the Geneva follow up of the Dayton meetings directed the fate of the Strasburg session.
It seems that Tudjman was cooperative enough in the further paper support of the BiH Federation, in cooperating with the Hague tribunal, that his procedural sadism over the opposition in Zagreb became of secondary importance. It is becoming obvious that the new block lineup in Europe will surely rise the price of the states and the regimes which find themselves in between. With all this, though, falls the elementary believability of the Croatian opposition, which naively hoped for the support of the West, and still imagines that it her support concerning the membership of the CE is of crucial importance.
A day after confirmation of the news from Strasburg, Z. Tomac (SDP party) pathetically stated that the letter of support with his signature was "a strong argument of Croatia" and then even expressed hope that Tudjman will have in mind "and confirm our mayor of Zagreb". Of course, the opposite happened, and with the same hand onto which he received the humbling kiss of the opposition, Tudjman slapped her again, which now rings with shame for both sides. Since, if the opposition states, through the Tomac letter, that non-election of the Zagreb mayor "cannot be" the reason for the refusal of Croatian membership, even that for the Zagreb crisis the blame lays with bad laws and not the regime (as if the laws fall from the sky), what else can be concluded that that the opposition for four months fought for the goals in which it does not believe itself, and that it fought for the electoral will of the citizens whom it is ready itself to humiliate.
The things are that much worse that the opposition fell out of the game in the field where it matched the HDZ successfully for years, and in 1994 even derailed it. That is the Bosnian policy, on which, then and now, hinged the international position of Croatia, but about which the opposition for a long time has no need or inspiration to say anything.
Source: Split weekly "Feral Tribune, March 25, 1996
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A regular contributor of the Zagreb weekly "Globus", university professor dr. Mirjana Kasapovic, discusses in the magazine's issue of March 1, 1996, the cropping up of further authoritarian elements in the rule of the HDZ party in Croatia.
The ruling HDZ party is not feeling secure anymore as a big and strong party. This is seen in the proposed law, by which the local, elections on all levels would be conducted by a proportional system. This is the law by which it won the first elections in 1990, but which it changed into majority system afterwards. As its influence among the voters began to weaken, it slowly started to slide towards the proportional system. The introduction of a full proportionality system in local elections only announces the turn of events at the next parliamentary elections.
HDZ has been going in this direction by the simple fact that it cannot stand anymore the majority elections. Since 14 of its 17 candidates lost the elections in a confrontation with the candidates of the unified opposition in Zagreb, it cannot find respectable members of the party anymore which would be willing to put their heads on the "electoral guillotine" in Zagreb, as well as it cannot allow itself another such electoral debacle.
To such an institutional challenge, the opposition can answer in two manners, thinks dr. Kasapovic. It should form a joint list of united opposition as a counterweight to the list of the ruling party, since in proportional elections it is voted for election lists, and not parties. Only a joint list of the opposition could get more votes that the HDZ list, and only in that manner could the opposition retain its gains and the un-democratically taken right to form the city government in Zagreb.
With this,the opposition has to clearly tell the voters two things: first, that the goal behind the formation of this large coalition is the change of the ruling team in Zagreb, which is a legitimate democratic demand; secondly, that ideologically and politically different parties are tied together but the belief that the remaining of HDZ in power has become the obstacle to the achievement of democracy.
Further, the opposition parties have to absolutely insist on a full overseeing of the complete process of voting, particularly over the counting of voting ballots. It has to be institutionalized in a proportionally formed voting boards and with the participation of international observers.
The expression of weakness and conflicts within HDZ is in the new turn towards authoritarian form of thinking and rule, best seen in the recent public appearances
of the paty and state president, Dr. Franjo Tudjman.Dr. Kasapovic lists six
elements of recent authoritarianism :
1. There is now an open use of the category of "internal political enemy", which, supposedly, leads permanent psychological war against the ruling party and the state.
2. "New political emigration" is introduced as political category, it being depicted as the opposer of the existing political regime and the party that personifies it. It is stated that its main goal is to "instruct" the opposition in "bringing down" HDZ from power.
3. Legal forms of political and social activity have been condemned and put under criminal activity, such as political demonstrations and union strikes. The strikes are seen as a part of a conceived anti-state conspiracy, so that "conscious workers" are called upon to resist them.
4. Curtailing of political pluralism has been announced, putting a part of the opposition in a criminal category, portraying it as the continuation of treasonous political movements in history. This is particularly geared towards regional political parties (the strongest being in Istria and Dalmatia).
5. Also announced are curtailings of basic political rights and freedoms, with multiple signs that Croatia will exist with curtailed democracy.
6. The political ideology of the party is more and more substituted with a certain political mentality.
Source: Zagreb weekly "Globus", March 1, 1996
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